What we found – Quality

2.1 This chapter sets out our views on the quality of the police recorded fraud and computer misuse statistics for England and Wales. We consider both Action Fraud data, which cover fraud and computer misuse offences, and data from two industry bodies (Cifas and UK Finance), which cover fraud offences only.

2.2 We review all aspects of quality, including the way that crimes are recorded, how data are quality-assured and the level of engagement between the organisations involved in the collection and processing of data. We make several recommendations for quality improvements across all stages of the data process.

2.3 Compared to our review of the quality of police recorded crime statistics for England and Wales, it has been more challenging for us to determine the quality of the police recorded fraud and computer misuse data. Unlike other crime types, fraud and computer misuse crime recording by the City of London Police is not inspected by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), and there are gaps in publicly available quality information. We have concerns about some aspects of data quality, such as the quality assurance arrangements.

2.4 Some of our quality concerns are linked to the Action Fraud system. The City of London Police is very aware of the limitations of the current system and is replacing Action Fraud with a new Fraud and Cyber Crime Reporting and Analysis Service (FCCRAS) in 2025. It is not yet fully clear how FCCRAS will operate or enhance data quality, but it is expected to significantly impact the way fraud and computer misuse crimes are recorded, and how data quality is managed by the City of London Police. Ultimately, these changes will affect the quality of the statistics published by ONS. It is likely that some of our recommendations for improvement can be addressed by the new system.

Action Fraud data quality

Recording of fraud and computer misuse crimes

2.5 The Home Office requires the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB), via Action Fraud, to record fraud offences for statistical purposes. NFIB must record fraud and computer misuse offences in accordance with the Home Office Counting Rules for Fraud, which set out when and how these crimes should be recorded. These rules are separate to the Crime Recording Rules for other crime types. The Counting Rules for Fraud are complex and list 62 different categories for fraud offences.

2.6 One of the strengths of Action Fraud is that all fraud and computer misuse crimes are recorded centrally by the City of London Police. Other crime types are recorded locally by one of the 44 police forces in England and Wales. Such centralised recording of these crimes minimises the scope for discrepancies in interpreting the counting rules and recording errors, thereby improving data consistency.

2.7 The nature of fraud and computer misuse has changed substantially since the counting rules were first developed. Although the Home Office regularly updates the counting rules with new offences and guidance, the current rules have not kept pace with these changes. This is clearly illustrated by the number of offences recorded as NFIB90 (other fraud). The NFIB Fraud and Cyber Crime Dashboard shows that in the 13 months up to March 2025, NFIB90 (other fraud) was the most reported crime code, accounting for 25% of offences recorded.

2.8 The only publicly available study exploring the types of fraud recorded as NFIB90 by Action Fraud was that conducted by Correia (2022). The study found that ‘Courier Fraud’, where a fraudster contacts victims by telephone purporting to be a police officer or bank official, was the most frequent type of fraud in this ‘other’ category (36% of coded crimes). This crime is not currently captured in the counting rules.

2.9 The City of London Police told us that a team manually reviews NFIB90 fraud crimes, and, where possible, recategorises them. Because a quarter to a third of all fraud crime records are initially categorised as NFIB90, this work is resource-intensive.

2.10 The City of London Police and the Home Office are aware that the counting rules are too complex and no longer fit for purpose. We therefore welcome that the City of London Police is working with the National Crime Registrar to refresh the counting rules and outcomes for fraud. There is limited information available publicly about plans for the review. Users of police recorded fraud and computer misuse statistics would benefit from greater transparency about the review.

Fraud reporting systems

2.11 When reporting an incident through the Action Fraud online tool, victims must choose an offence from the list of fraud and computer misuse offences in the Counting Rules for Fraud. This approach to crime reporting is problematic because it relies on victims knowing what type of fraud or computer misuse they have been a victim of. Some users of the statistics that we spoke to expressed concern about this aspect of the online tool and its impact on data quality.

2.12 The City of London Police highlighted additional issues with the online tool to us. Victim reports sometimes lack the necessary detail for the force to be able to create, cancel or correctly classify the crime. Furthermore, those crimes that are recorded may be difficult to categorise or are incorrectly categorised. Such issues are likely reducing the accuracy of the recorded fraud data.

2.13 The City of London Police also told us that the information that Action Fraud collects through its call centres poses a challenge to recording crimes accurately. We heard that the main challenge it faced in recording fraud and computer misuse accurately was inaccurate crime classification from call centres.

Quality assurance of Action Fraud data

2.14 The City of London Police has processes in place to quality-assure the fraud information it receives from all reporting methods (namely, directly from the public via the Action Fraud online tool or the Action Fraud telephone helpline, and from other police forces and financial institutions). For example, the Action Fraud call centre has a quality assurance team that carries out checks on information.

2.15 The force told us that the force’s crime registrar undertakes regular internal audits of fraud and computer misuse crime records using a similar method to the audits the force carries out on other types of crime records. These audits are not published.

2.16 We identified areas where data processes or quality assurance arrangements could be strengthened. For example, we heard that data must be extracted manually from the system and checked in spreadsheets. This reliance on manual checks creates room for human error, which may negatively impact data quality. We were also told the current system contains no automated checks, though there is manual exception reporting for unusually large amounts of money reported as lost by victims. Without rigorous automated checks, data entry errors could be missed.

2.17 Our finding is supported by Correia’s (2022) study, which identified a range of issues with the accuracy and completeness of Action Fraud data, using data from Welsh police forces. The author had to undertake extensive data cleansing to make the data suitable for analysis. This may suggest that the level of quality assurance applied to the Action Fraud data is insufficient. Correia’s paper included recommendations for additional validation checks to improve data quality.

Fraud and Cyber Crime Reporting and Analysis Service (FCCRAS)

2.18 The City of London Police is replacing Action Fraud with a new Fraud and Cyber Crime Reporting and Analysis Service (FCCRAS). This is a key commitment of the UK Government’s 2023 Fraud Strategy.

2.19 The City of London Police told us that FCCRAS will be easily changed and updated compared to their current recording system. It is difficult and costly to make changes in the current system to reflect changes in the methods used by criminals or to collect new information from victims. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, it was not possible to ask victims if their incident was linked to the pandemic.

2.20 We also heard that the new system has been designed to make it easier for victims to report fraud and computer misuse. The new reporting system will be question-based rather than victim decision-based (as explained in ‘fraud reporting systems’), which will help victims submit more-accurate reports and thus improve the quality of crime records.

2.21 The new system is expected have enhanced functionality, such as the ability to add ‘flags’ to crime records, for example, to indicate whether the crime was cyber-enabled. Flags on crime records will provide more standardised context and detail about how fraud is committed.

2.22 The new system is still under development, and it is not yet fully clear how it will operate or enhance data quality. FCCRAS was expected to have been rolled out by the City of London Police by early 2024 but has been delayed for various reasons. We have been told that the new system is due to be launched in 2025. The FCCRAS rollout is a five-year programme and not all changes will be introduced immediately.

2.23 The new system will potentially create discontinuities in Action Fraud data. ONS, the Home Office and the City of London Police should work together to understand the impact of the new system on data quality, including the comparability of data over time.

The role of HMICFRS

2.24 His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) regularly inspects the crime data integrity of all police forces in England and Wales. These inspections are widely seen as a measure of the extent to which forces are complying with Home Office Counting Rules. HMICFRS examines whether the crimes reported to the police are recorded when they should be (the ‘crime recording accuracy’), among other criteria. Our report on the quality of police recorded crime statistics for England and Wales provides more detail on HMICFRS’s methodology to determine crime data integrity.  

2.25 As we outlined in our police recorded crime report, HMICFRS plays a vital role in holding forces to account for their crime recording standards. HMICFRS’s crime data integrity inspections help us understand differences in crime recording standards across police forces and how these change over time. Its inspection reports are the only publicly available source of information about crime recording accuracy in England and Wales. However, crime data integrity inspections exclude fraud and computer misuse, as these crimes are recorded only by the City of London Police. The City of London Police’s last crime data integrity audit in 2019 did not include fraud crimes as part of the inspection.

2.26 HMICFRS conducted a thematic inspection in 2018 of the police response to fraud in England and Wales, and published an update in 2021, but this inspection did not look at fraud crime recording. HMICFRS has never inspected fraud and computer misuse crime recording by the City of London Police. This means that there is no publicly available information about how accurately the City of London Police is recording these crimes. Regular scrutiny by HMICFRS would support improvements to fraud and computer misuse crime recording.

Industry bodies data quality

2.27 ONS’s police recorded fraud statistics include data from two industry bodies – Cifas, a fraud prevention service that gathers intelligence on fraud from its members, and UK Finance, a trade association representing firms in the UK financial services sector. These industry bodies only cover a subset of the fraud types covered by Action Fraud and do not cover computer misuse.

The quality of Cifas data

2.28 Cifas collects information on fraud from its members via two central reporting databases:

• National Fraud Database (NFD) – used to share fraud risk information about actual or attempted fraudulent conduct against organisations. NFD data are shared with the City of London Police.
• Insider Threat Database (ITD) – records instances of dishonest conduct by job applicants and employees in the workforce. ITD holds fraud risk data relating to internal fraud threats, such as bribery and corruption and theft of personal or commercial data.

2.29 All members record instances of fraudulent activity by creating a case on the NFD, after they have investigated it. A range of information is recorded, including the product type (the sector) and fraud type, as well as more-granular information on what the fraudster did. This allows other members to search and use the information to reduce their exposure to fraud and financial crime (the primary purpose of the database).

2.30 Cifas acknowledged that there may be some degree of under-reporting on the NFD linked to the risk appetite of members and their ability to reach the standard required to record a case. For instance, organisations would not record fraudulent activity if the circumstances of the case did not warrant closing the case, but these incidents likely comprise a small proportion of all incidents.

2.31 Both Cifas and its members are responsible for the quality of the data submitted. Cifas explained to us that it is in members’ interest to provide accurate information as they are sharing it to help other members. To use the NFD, members must follow the Cifas National Fraud Database Handbook, a guide which sets out the principles of use. The principles outline the standard of proof required to file a case to the NFD, one aspect of which is that the evidence submitted must be clear, relevant and rigorous. Cifas says that adhering to these principles helps members maintain the quality and integrity of the data.

2.32 Cifas’ quality assurance arrangements seem robust and well established. Cifas has a compliance review process that checks the accuracy of the information recorded and whether the case meets the required standard of proof for a sample of records. Members are asked to verify the information and send the evidence to Cifas, which is then reviewed and validated.

2.33 Cifas told us that there are additional layers of quality assurance that help identify inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the data. As an example, Cifas receives thousands of data subject access requests, where individuals request information held about them on the NFD, every month. If the consumer chooses to dispute the information held about them, then this is dealt with by the member organisation in the first instance. But in the event that the consumer is dissatisfied with the outcome, then they are able to escalate to Cifas for review of the case files. Additionally, NFD data go through a validation process as part of the production of Cifas’ annual Fraudscape report.

The quality of UK Finance data

2.34 The UK Finance figures presented in ONS’s statistics reflect two separate reporting functions:

• Fraud management information – member reporting of values and volumes of all fraud incidents where a financial loss is suffered.
• Fraud intelligence sharing – voluntary member sharing of actionable fraud intelligence with the City of London Police.

Fraud management information

2.35 This information is considered to provide the most complete picture of the scale of fraud experienced by financial institutions in the UK and is published by UK Finance in its Annual and Half-yearly Fraud Report.

2.36 The management information goes through an extensive quality assurance process. Members complete monthly preset templates that have automated checks built in, for example, to ensure that there is always a loss associated with a report. UK Finance carries out a range of consistency checks on the data to identify unusual changes between time periods at both the member level and industry level. Before the annual statistics are published, the data go through a reconciliation process, where UK Finance asks members to check and sign off submissions. UK Finance also uses other data sources, such as market share data, to validate the distribution of fraud reports across members.

Fraud intelligence sharing

2.37 UK Finance facilitates a secure data feed of intelligence records between its member firms and the City of London Police. It is primarily the responsibility of the financial institutions to ensure that the information is accurate and actionable. There are some automated data checks built into the reporting system to ensure that the information entered by members is valid, but UK Finance does no further quality assurance of the reports shared with City of London Police.

Quality challenges of industry bodies data

Isolating England and Wales fraud reports

2.38 Cifas and UK Finance fraud data cover the whole of the UK, but ONS only publishes fraud statistics for England and Wales. It can be challenging to isolate England and Wales reports from UK data. Some fraud reports include multiple addresses, some of which may be located outside England and Wales.

2.39 The Cifas statistics published by ONS reflect the number of England and Wales reports on Cifas’ database. Cifas excludes reports that do not have an active and permanent address in England and Wales before it sends data to the Home Office and ONS.

2.40 In contrast, the UK Finance statistics published by ONS are estimates. To calculate the estimates for England and Wales, the Home Office applies an adjustment to the UK Finance Intelligence data based on the proportion of Cifas reports that cover England and Wales. The conversion factor used for this calculation is supplied by Cifas. Cifas told us that the Home Office has not requested an updated conversion factor since 2021. Although the value is unlikely to change substantially from year to year, the Home Office should work with Cifas to regularly update the conversion factor to ensure that the UK Finance estimates are as accurate as possible.

Monitoring duplication of fraud offences across datasets

2.41 Some organisations are members of both Cifas and UK Finance and may report the same fraudulent activity to both industry bodies, which can lead to duplication of fraud offences in the two datasets. The offence may also appear in the Action Fraud dataset, for example, if the incident has been reported to Action Fraud by the victim or by the financial organisation (such as bank). There is, therefore, the potential for double- or triple-counting crimes, which would artificially inflate the number of fraud offences recorded.

2.42 In its user guide to crime statistics, ONS informs users that ‘experts believe the scale of duplication of offences across data sources is likely to be small’. However, the true scale of duplication is unknown. The scale probably depends on the dataset; duplication across the Cifas and UK Finance Intelligence datasets is likely to be larger than duplication across the Action Fraud and Cifas or UK Finance Intelligence datasets. A data match has never been carried out between Cifas and UK Finance Intelligence data.

2.43 The City of London Police confirmed to us that is not possible to cross-reference Action Fraud crime records with Cifas and UK Finance reports in the current system. However, the force said that it should be possible in FCCRAS, and it sees this as an important and necessary piece of work. The City of London Police should investigate the scale of duplication across the Action Fraud, Cifas and UK Finance datasets once the new system has been rolled out, and ONS should report the findings of this data quality work.

Home Office oversight of data quality

2.44 Our review of the quality of police recorded crime statistics for England and Wales set out the Home Office’s quality assurance arrangements in detail.

2.45 The Home Office’s processes for collating and quality-assuring police recorded fraud and computer misuse data differ from those in place for other police recorded crime data in several ways:

• The data are managed by a different analytical team, not the Crime Analysis Unit that is responsible for the Home Office Data Hub.
• The Action Fraud data that the Home Office receives from the City of London Police are aggregate-level data, not record-level data. The data are shared manually via Excel spreadsheets, not via the Home Office Data Hub.
• In addition to Action Fraud data, the Home Office receives aggregate-level Cifas and UK Finance fraud data. The City of London Police supplies UK Finance intelligence data, whereas Cifas sends fraud data directly to the Home Office. UK Finance supplies aggregate-level fraud management information directly to the Home Office to provide context on the scale of the fraud landscape.

2.46 Below, we outline the Home Office’s quality assurance arrangements for Action Fraud and industry bodies data.

Action Fraud data

2.47 The Home Office receives aggregate-level Action Fraud data from the City of London Police. As a result, the quality assurance that it can apply to the data is limited to sense and consistency checks. These checks involve comparisons of data between time periods to look for unusual changes or discrepancies. Data processing and validation is carried out manually, which increases the risk of human error.

2.48 As explained earlier, there is no publicly available information about the City of London Police’s fraud and computer crime recording because HMICFRS’s crime data integrity inspection of the force excludes fraud offences. This lack of quality information, together with the limited scope for quality assurance, means that the Home Office has an incomplete view of the quality of Action Fraud data.

2.49 Access to record-level Action Fraud data would enable the Home Office to carry out more-thorough quality assurance and more-detailed analysis and bring the process for police recorded fraud and computer misuse data in line with other police recorded crime data. As we highlighted in our review of the quality of police recorded crime statistics, the provision of record-level data by individual police forces has improved the quality of the statistics.

2.50 We understand that the new fraud recording system will have enhanced functionality that will allow the City of London Police to extract record-level data for the Home Office. Once the Home Office receives record-level data, it could then develop a Reproducible Analytical Pipeline (RAP) to automate quality assurance processes and minimise the risk of human error.

2.51 While the Home Office waits for record-level data, we recommend that the City of London Police shares quality indicators with the Home Office as part of its quarterly data submission. These indicators should include the accuracy of crime records (whether a fraud offence reported to Action Fraud has been recorded as a crime when it should be). This information should be available from the regular audits of crime records carried out by the force’s crime registrar.

2.52 The Home Office is responsible for understanding how the City of London Police quality-assures Action Fraud data. We found that the Home Office has a limited understanding of the City of London Police’s quality assurance arrangements. This echoes the findings of our review of the quality of police recorded crime statistics.

Industry bodies data

2.53 The Home Office also receives aggregate-level Cifas and UK Finance data. Again, the Home Office’s quality assurance of these data is limited to sense and consistency checks. These checks allow the Home Office to identify unusual changes over time. For instance, in 2022, the Home Office noticed a large increase in the monthly UK Finance intelligence data. UK Finance established that the increase was partly due to its efforts to improve the volume of actionable intelligence that members can share with the City of London Police. This information enabled the Home Office to explain the change to ONS, which subsequently added a caveat to the statistical bulletin.

2.54 The Home Office understands the limitations of the industry bodies data. As part of its data submission, Cifas sends the Home Office a report that summarises notable increases or decreases in the number of offences since the previous quarter, and discusses possible drivers of the changes, such as changes to a company’s reporting. Cifas also sends a list of members that highlights changes to membership. This helps the Home Office (and ONS) contextualise the data.

ONS’s quality information

2.55 As with other police recorded crime data, ONS is two steps removed from the fraud and computer misuse data. It relies on the Home Office to collate and quality-assure data from the City of London Police, Cifas and UK Finance. Like the Home Office, ONS does not have access to record-level Action Fraud data, so the quality assurance it applies to the fraud and computer misuse data is limited to consistency checks. These checks are identical to the checks we described in our review of the quality of police recorded crime statistics for England and Wales.

2.56 ONS’s user guide to crime statistics contains detailed information about the nature of Action Fraud and industry bodies data. The sources of administrative data on fraud diagram published in the user guide are particularly helpful, explaining what each organisation does, how it records fraud and how the data are published. The user guide and data tables are transparent about the limitations and data quality issues of each data source, which supports appropriate use of the statistics.

2.57 Notwithstanding this, we identified several gaps in the quality information:

• The Crime in England and Wales statistical bulletin does not contain a caveat about the unreliability of the police recorded fraud and computer misuse statistics as a measure of trends in these crime types. The bulletin does, however, include this caveat for other crime types, such as domestic abuse and sexual offences.
• ONS does not provide sufficient assurance for users about the quality assurance arrangements used by the City of London Police, Cifas and UK Finance. As outlined earlier, we want the Home Office to strengthen its oversight of these areas of data quality.
• Neither the Crime in England and Wales statistical bulletin nor the data tables mention that the UK Finance statistics are estimates. Only the user guide explains how the estimate is calculated. ONS should clarify that the figures are estimates and more clearly indicate the uncertainty around the figure, for example, by rounding.
• There is no mention of the planned review of the Counting Rules for Fraud or the City of London Police’s rollout of FCCRAS. ONS should alert users to these forthcoming changes as they will impact the comparability of the statistics over time.

Coherence of data sources

2.58 We explored the consistency and comparability of the data sources used to produce fraud and computer misuse statistics and examined how these factors may influence the interpretation of the statistics.

Action Fraud and Crime Survey for England and Wales data

2.59 There are many different types of fraud, and the nature of fraud is constantly evolving. Due to the complexity of fraud crimes, there are no universally agreed definitions or classifications. The 62 categories in the Counting Rules for Fraud used by the City of London police are based on statute definitions (set out in the Fraud Act 2006). As we discussed earlier, these categories do not accurately capture the nature of modern fraud crimes and are currently being reviewed by the City of London Police and the Home Office.

2.60 The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) uses four major fraud categories: bank and credit account fraud, advance fee fraud, consumer and retail fraud, and other fraud. The CSEW categories are aligned as closely as possible to the high-level counting rules categories, as show in Table 2.

Table 2. Alignment between CSEW fraud categories and Counting Rules for Fraud categories (as recorded in Action Fraud).

2.61 ONS told us it is unable to produce more-granular breakdowns of CSEW fraud incidents (aligned to lower-level NFIB codes) due to survey sample size limitations and because not all counting rules categories are relevant for offences against individuals. Nearly all other NFIB codes cover fraud offences against businesses and organisations, which are not captured by the CSEW.

2.62 Computer misuse crimes are more straightforward to categorise and align as there are fewer types of offence.

2.63 Some users told us they were frustrated by the lack of coherence between Action Fraud and CSEW fraud statistics at a more granular level. They suggested standardising the definitions and classifications of fraud and computer misuse. To help users understand the coherence of the two datasets, ONS should be clearer about how the CSEW categories map on the counting rules categories.

2.64 The rollout of the new fraud reporting and recording system and the refresh of the Counting Rules for Fraud will lead to changes to the way fraud crimes are categorised. We welcome that ONS has been providing input and advice to the City of London Police on the development of the new system. The review of the counting rules presents a good opportunity to ensure closer alignment between Action Fraud and CSEW categories and to ‘future-proof’ the categories so that they are robust enough to handle the evolving nature of fraud crimes. ONS should continue to work with the City of London Police and the Home Office to achieve this.

Action Fraud and industry bodies data

2.65 Cifas and UK Finance do not record fraud offences in line with the Home Office Counting Rules for Fraud. We found that neither body has set up the process to follow the counting rules. Cifas and UK Finance have their own guidelines for recording fraud; for example, as explained earlier, Cifas members use the National Fraud Database Handbook.

2.66 To ensure that Cifas and UK Finance intelligence reports can be used by the City of London Police for operational purposes, and that fraud offences are counted consistently, Cifas and UK Finance reports are assigned to a Counting Rules category. This is done using a mapping ruleset that was developed by City of London Police and Cifas shortly after Action Fraud was established.

2.67 To be recorded as a crime on the Action Fraud system, Cifas and UK Finance reports must meet the counting rules threshold of a crime. The City of London Police told us that fewer than 5% of Cifas and UK Finance reports are recorded as crimes. Reports which are not recorded as crimes are logged as information reports. Where relevant, intelligence from Cifas and UK Finance reports is added to existing crime records. This referral process was set up to avoid overburdening UK Finance and Cifas members having to report to Action Fraud and overwhelming Action Fraud.

2.68 Given that the majority of Cifas and UK Finance reports are not categorised as crimes by the City of London Police, the number of fraud reports captured by the industry bodies is not directly comparable to number of fraud crimes recorded by Action Fraud. However, ONS presents these data as if they are comparable. In ONS’s statistical bulletins, Action Fraud, Cifas and UK Finance fraud data are collectively referred to as ‘police recorded fraud’; total police recorded fraud is the sum of the number of crimes or reports in the three datasets.

2.69 We therefore consider that the term ‘police recorded fraud’ is potentially confusing for users. It suggests that all industry bodies reports are recorded as crimes by the City of London Police, but this is not the case for the current fraud recording system. The force told us that Cifas reports will be handled differently in the new fraud recording system; in FCCRAS, all Cifas reports will be treated as a crime and comply with the Counting Rules for Fraud. As a result, Action Fraud and Cifas data will be directly comparable in the new system.

2.70 ONS needs to better communicate the comparability of fraud statistics. In addition, it should develop a better understanding of how City of London Police handles Cifas and UK Finance reports, and of Cifas and UK Finance’s recording processes.

Engagement and collaboration

2.71 The Code of Practice for Statistics’ Quality pillar requires that statistics producers maintain good relationships with data suppliers. As such, we looked at the relationships between the organisations involved in collecting and publishing police recorded crime fraud and computer misuse data.

2.72 We found that the degree of collaboration between the Home Office and the City of London Police varies across Home Office teams. For example, the Home Office fraud evidence and analysis team (which uses Action Fraud data but does not process them) told us it speaks to the City of London Police regularly and has shadowed teams.

2.73 We consider that engagement and collaboration between the City of London Police and the Home Office fraud data team (which processes the data) could be improved. We heard that the City of London Police, the Home Office fraud data team and ONS’s crime statistics team used to have regular meetings about Action Fraud data, but these meetings were discontinued several years ago. Recent attempts to restart these meetings by ONS and the Home Office have not been successful. The Home Office should continue to pursue this, as regular meetings would enhance its oversight of fraud and computer misuse data quality.

2.74 We found that the Home Office fraud data team engages with industry bodies; it receives data and quality information directly from Cifas and UK Finance. The Home Office told us that the main barrier to closer working with the industry bodies is staff turnover, which can lead to uncertainty on whom to contact and gaps in engagement. For instance, we heard that when there is a direct contact, the Home Office usually receives regular updates, but when the contact leaves, the Home Office reverts to using the shared mailbox.

2.75 ONS said it has a constructive working relationship with both the Home Office fraud data team and fraud evidence and analysis team. It meets both teams regularly to discuss CSEW developments and police recorded fraud and computer misuse data. ONS’s engagement with the industry bodies and the City of London Police is more limited. ONS told us it may contact the industry bodies directly if it has questions about the presentation of the statistics, but questions about data quality tend to go via the Home Office fraud data team.