In April last year, we published a think piece setting out the Office for Statistics Regulation (OSR)’s reflections on the role of statistics and OSR in an evolving public sphere. The recent death, in March 2026, of the philosopher Jürgen Habermas, whose modern theory of the public sphere informed that think piece, has prompted us to revisit the concept one year on. We have done so by considering the relationship between the public sphere and one of the most significant developments in UK statistics regulation in the last year: the introduction of new Standards for the Public Use of Statistics in the revised version of the Code of Practice for Statistics, published in October 2025.
Statistics’ role in the information foundation of the public sphere
As we discussed in our previous think piece, Jürgen Habermas’s concept of the public sphere offers a powerful lens through which to understand the role of official statistics in democratic life. For Habermas, the public sphere is not merely a physical or institutional space, but a normative ideal – a domain in which citizens engage in rational-critical debate about matters of common concern.
Deliberation of this nature depends on accessibility, inclusivity and – crucially – a shared foundation of credible information. In contemporary societies saturated with data and challenged by misinformation, statistical production and communication have a vital role in mediating the integrity of that informational foundation. As highlighted in a recent blog by the Chief Executive of the Science Media Centre, Fiona Fox, “misinformation will thrive if we don’t flood the public sphere with the measured, accurate evidence that the public is asking us for.” OSR’s Standards for the Public Use of Statistics – namely Equality of Access, Supporting Understanding, and Decision Making and Leadership – can therefore be seen as our contribution to an effort to sustain the epistemic conditions necessary for a functioning public sphere.
At the heart of Habermas’s theory is the idea that democratic legitimacy arises from reasoned agreement among citizens. Such agreement is only possible if participants in public discourse can rely on commonly accepted knowledge. Statistics play a central role here: they inform debates about economic performance, public health, inequality and countless other issues that structure political life. Yet statistics are not neutral artefacts. They are produced through methodological choices, framed through presentation and interpreted within contexts of power. Without safeguards, they can be misused – such as being selectively cited, misleadingly visualised or stripped of uncertainty – to advance particular agendas. In such cases, the public sphere risks degradation into what Habermas describes in his work, Theory of Communicative Action, as a space of strategic communication, where pure persuasion displaces the use of reason.
The role of the new Standards for the Public Use of Statistics
This is where OSR’s new standards become significant. The standards seek to ensure that statistics being used in the public domain are fit for democratic use by the widest audience possible. They do so by setting out OSR’s expectations for how statistics, data and wider analysis should be used in the public domain by public bodies. As such, they are relevant to a wide range of professions and roles across public bodies, including communication professionals, policy professionals, analysts, permanent secretaries, ministers and special advisers. They complement the Standards for Official Statistics, which set out the standards and practices that producers of official statistics must adhere to – the Code of Practice’s core standards of Trustworthiness, Quality and Value.
Equality of Access is fundamental to ensuring that all participants in public discourse operate on a level playing field. By mandating that statistics used in the public domain are available to everyone in a timely way, this standard aims to prevent the concentration of informational power among elites and encourage transparent decision-making. This directly supports Habermas’s insistence that the ideal public sphere must be accessible to all, not restricted by privilege or hierarchy. When journalists, researchers and citizens have equal access to data, they are better equipped to question, analyse and contribute meaningfully to debate. We highlighted the importance of equality of access during our casework intervention into the Prime Minister’s comments on immigration returns in September 2024.
Supporting Understanding extends this principle by recognising that access alone is insufficient for the public sphere to function. Habermas emphasised the importance of rational-critical discourse, which depends not just on the availability of information but also on its intelligibility. This standard calls for clarity, accuracy and contextualisation when statistics are used in the public domain, helping users grasp both the meaning and limitations of data. This reduces the risk of misinterpretation and manipulation, enabling discussions that are grounded in evidence and reason rather than confusion or misinformation. OSR’s public intervention in March 2025 regarding a government press release on Universal Credit claimant numbers was informed by this principle.
Decision Making and Leadership completes the framework by linking statistical integrity to political accountability and the independence of statistical production. This standard is less overtly linked to Habermas’ work on the public sphere but is nonetheless important. This standard encourages leaders of public bodies to seek and use impartial, expert advice when using statistics, but also encourages public bodies to proactively support decisions made by analytical leaders. The intention is to increase trustworthiness, of information and institutions by creating conditions in which the public can have confidence that statistics inform decision-making and have been used appropriately.
Turning ideas into action
Taken together, these standards help translate Habermas’s abstract ideals into concrete practices for the public use of statistics and knowledge communication by public bodies. The connection is not merely illustrative but structural. Habermas’s public sphere can be seen to depend on a shared epistemic infrastructure – conditions under which information can be trusted, debated and revised. We believe that OSR’s public use standards can contribute to building and maintaining that infrastructure. The standards do not guarantee consensus, nor do they eliminate disagreement; rather, they help ensure that disagreements are anchored in a common evidentiary terrain. In this sense, statistical regulation has a key part to play in facilitating the “measured, accurate evidence” which Fiona Fox describes.
However, the alignment is not perfect. We recognise that standards alone cannot prevent the politicisation of data or the unequal distribution of interpretive power. Even well-produced and well-communicated statistics can be misunderstood or weaponised, particularly in environments marked by low statistical literacy or polarised media ecosystems. We also understand that our standards are not the only factor guiding actors in the public sphere.
Nevertheless, OSR’s Standards for the Public Use of Statistics represent a new and exciting effort to uphold the conditions of democratic discourse among public bodies. They remind us that statistics are not merely technical outputs but public assets, integral to the health of the public sphere. If Habermas is right in his belief that democracy depends on the quality of our collective reasoning, then ensuring the trustworthiness and accessibility of statistical information is not optional – it is foundational.
